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Abstract
In multiserver (MS) environments, it is preferable for a remote user to login to diﬀerent service provider
servers by keying in the same password. Recently, Wang et al. proposed an improvement on the dynamic
identity-based smart card authentication scheme of Liao and Wang for MS environments. Sandeep et al.
improved the dynamic identity-based smart card authentication scheme of Hsiang et al. for MS architecture.
However, we found that the schemes of Wang et al. and Sandeep et al. failed to provide service provider
server authentication, perfect forward security, and login scalability. In addition, the scheme of Sandeep et
al. was insecure against stolen veriﬁer attacks. This paper proposes an improved smart card-based password
authentication scheme for MS environments. The new scheme removes all of the abovementioned weaknesses.
The proposed identity-based smart card authentication scheme satisﬁes the following properties: C1. User
authentication; C2. Service provider server authentication; C3. Control server authentication; C4. Perfect
forward security; C5. Freedom of password change; C6. Scalability of login; C7. Resistance to stolen veriﬁer
attacks; and C8. High eﬃciency.
Key Words: Multiserver, password, smart card, CDH assumptions

1.

Introduction

The internet environment requires mechanisms that prevent unauthorized users from accessing resources. A user
and a server must agree on a session key beforehand. The Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange provides a shared secret
key, but no authentication [1]. The common building blocks such as nonces, certiﬁcates, the Diﬃe-Hellman
key exchange, and encrypted or signed messages are applied to build up authentication key exchange schemes.
Some derivation systems of the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange are given in [1]. Lamport proposed a solution,
a password-based authentication scheme, to deal with remote user access [2]. A password is one of the most
acceptable and widely used authentication mechanisms [3]. Many authentication schemes are password-based
(e.g., telnet and Kerberos). However, Lamport’s scheme needs a password table stored in the computer system.
Moreover, the low entropy of the password makes it susceptible to dictionary attacks. Recently, smart cards
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have been widely applied to the construction of password-based authentication schemes. Smart cards can store
the sensitive data of the card holder. The smart card holder inserts his or her card into a reader and keys
in the password and identity information. The smart card takes these as input, computes the login message,
and sends the login message to the server. Many smart card-based remote user authentication schemes have
been proposed due to their low cost and portability. Smart card-based password authentication (SCPA) is one
of the most convenient and commonly used authentication techniques. However, since the smart card has a
limited capacity for computation and storage, some complicated solutions are not suitable for smart card-based
authentication schemes. In the literature, password authentication schemes using smart cards can be divided
into 2 types, namely hash-based authentication and public-key based authentication. The ﬁrst type of SCPA
scheme is always more eﬃcient than the second one.
Most of the SCPA schemes address the single-server (SS) environment. A variety of eﬃcient SCPA-SS
schemes have already been proposed [4-6].
Since each user needs to have diﬀerent sets of identities and passwords with diﬀerent remote servers in the
multiserver (MS) environment, it is infeasible to apply the authentication methods in a SS environment to the
MS environment. Diﬀerent SCPA schemes have been proposed to access the resources in the MS environment
[5-11]. In 2000, Ford and Kaliski [12] proposed the ﬁrst SCPA-MS scheme, which splits a password among
2 or more independent servers. However, the scheme has a high computation cost and needs a prior secure
authentication channel between the user and the server. In 2001, Tsaur et al. proposed a SCPA-MS scheme
based on the RSA cryptosystem [13]. Li et al. applied an artiﬁcial neural network to construct an ineﬃcient
SCPA-MS scheme [5]. Tsaur et al. improved the scheme of Li et al. [14]. However, the scheme of Tsaur
et al. is still insecure [15]. In 2004, Juang proposed a SCPA-MS scheme based on the hashing function and
symmetric-key cryptosystem [16] Nevertheless, Juang’s scheme suﬀers from online guessing attacks [17] and
oﬄine dictionary attacks [18]. Chang and Lee proposed an improved scheme using a symmetric encryption
algorithm [17]. Nevertheless, their scheme [17] still cannot withstand the insider attack, server spooﬁng attack,
and registration center spooﬁng attack [7]. Hu et al. proposed a SCPA-MS scheme, but their scheme fails
to meet the security requirements of the MS environment [19]. The SCPA-MS scheme in [18] is also insecure
[8]. Tsai proposed a SCPA-MS scheme based on the one-way hash function without a veriﬁcation table [20].
Unfortunately, some attacks on it have been made [8-10,21].
Recently, Liao and Wang proposed a SCPA-MS scheme (LW-scheme) [8]. The LW-scheme only uses a hash
function to implement a strong authentication. However, the LW-scheme is still vulnerable to insider attacks,
masquerade attacks, server spooﬁng attacks, and registration center spooﬁng attacks [21,22]. Furthermore,
it fails to provide mutual authentication [9,20,21]. In 2009, Hsiang and Shih proposed an improved SCPAMS scheme (HS-scheme) [22]. However, the HS-scheme has shown [923] that it suﬀers from replay attacks,
impersonation attacks, and stolen smart card attacks. Chen et al. [9] proposed an improvement (CHC-scheme)
on the HS-scheme. Sandeep et al. [23] also presented a secure dynamic identity-based SCPA-MS scheme (SAKscheme) and claimed that the proposed scheme resolves the aforementioned security ﬂaws while keeping the
merits of Hsiang and Shih’s protocol. Recently, Wang et al. also proposed an eﬃcient SCPA-MS scheme (WJLscheme) [21]. In this study, we found that the CHC-scheme [9] was vulnerable to oﬄine password guessing
attacks, impersonation attacks, and server spooﬁng attacks. In addition, we will show that the WJL-scheme
and the SAK-scheme fail to provide service provider server authentication, perfect forward security, and login
scalability. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that the SAK-scheme suﬀers from stolen veriﬁer attacks.
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A new architecture for SCPA schemes in the MS environment was presented [24]. There, 2 levels of the
servers are composed of a control server and some service provider servers, in which only the service provider
servers communicate directly with the users and a control server does not interact with the users directly. The
framework of the MS requires additional eﬀorts from an adversary if the adversary launches an attack. However,
the control server in [24] requires a public key for its operations. Thus far, although many SCPA-MS schemes
consider the security goals, there is no common set of desirable security properties for SCPA-MS schemes.
Recently proposed SCPA-MS schemes still have various security weaknesses that are being overlooked, and
many of these schemes have been broken shortly after they were ﬁrst proposed. A secure SCPA-MS scheme
should have some stronger security properties than secure SCPA-SS schemes. In the next section, we will deﬁne
a reﬁned set of security requirements that not only captures the exact 2-factor authentication but also considers
the security of MS parties.
In this paper, we apply the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange technique [1] and the hash functions to construct
a new SCPA-MS scheme. Upon the computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumptions and the assumptions of the
existence of the collision resistant hash functions, the new SCPA-MS scheme satisﬁes all of the security
requirements deﬁned in this paper. Our scheme removes all of the weaknesses of several previous SCPA-MS
schemes [8,9,20-23].

1.1.

Our results

In this paper, our contributions are as follows:
1) We highlight the security attributes of a SCPA-MS scheme. These security requirements are an
extension and reﬁnement of some previously proposed security requirements of SCPA schemes. The setup of
security requirements can facilitate cryptanalyses of SCPA-MS schemes. These requirements are also associated
with an adversarial model.
2) We demonstrate that 2 recently proposed schemes fail to satisfy the security properties.
3) We propose a new eﬃcient SCPA-MS scheme. We show that the proposed SCPA-MS scheme satisﬁes
all of the security requirements.

1.2.

Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we propose a new set of desirable security
requirements and an adversarial model of SCPA-MS schemes. In Section 3, we review the WJL-scheme [21]
and the SAK-scheme [23]. The cryptanalyses show that the WJL-scheme fails to provide service provider server
authentication, perfect forward security, and login scalability, and that the SAK-scheme is insecure. In Section
4, we propose a new SCPA-MS scheme. In Section 5, we analyze its security properties and performance.
Finally, the conclusion will be given in Section 6.

2.

Security requirements

Consider the SCPA-MS schemes with the architecture of 2-level servers: the control server and the service
provider servers, in which the users access the service of service provider servers and a control server does not
interact with the users directly. In the literature, the control server is often called the registration center. In
our model, the control server does not only act as the registration center but also plays a greater role during
the authentication and session key exchange between users and service provider servers. In the SAK-scheme
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[23], the control server and the service provider servers come from the same domain. In fact, the control server
and the service provider servers are from diﬀerent domains. Our SCPA-MS model only requires that the service
provider servers must register the control server. One control server can manage many service provider servers
from diﬀerent departments. Therefore, the SCPA-MS model has more ﬂexibility and scalability.

2.1.

Skeleton of a SCPA-MS scheme

The SCPA-MS scheme involves some service provider servers Sj with identity SID j , user Ui with identity ID i ,
and control server CS. The SCPA-MS scheme is composed of the registration phase, login phase, authentication
and session key agreement phase, and password change phase.
1) Registration phase: The CS securely issues a smart card to the Ui , with the smart card being
personalized with respect to ID i and an easily remembered password. The CS also executes the registration
with each Sj . In this phase, all of the participants are assumed to be honest and execute the protocol according
to the speciﬁcation of the scheme. Registration is carried out only once for each Sj and each Ui .
2) Login phase: The Ui sends a request message to a Sj . The Sj generates a response message. The Sj
then transmits the Ui ’s request message and its response message to the CS. The Ui can access many Sj s by
using their smart cards and the same passwords.
3) Authentication and session key agreement phase: The CS authenticates the Sj and the Ui . Next, the
Sj and the Ui complete the mutual authentication. Finally, the Sj and Ui agree on the same session key.
4) Password change phase: The Ui can change his password freely without the presentence of the CS.
In the following, we describe the desirable security properties that a secure SCPA-MS scheme should
achieve and also describe the attacks that an adversary may mount against SCPA-MS schemes.

2.2.

Security goals

C1. User authentication: Both the Sj and the CS are sure that the service requestor is indeed a registered Ui
as the Ui claims.
C2. Service provider server authentication: Both the Ui and the CS are sure that the Sj is indeed the
Sj that the Ui attempts to access.
C3. Control server authentication: Both the Ui and the Sj are sure that the conﬁrmation message is
indeed from the CS.
C4. Perfect forward security: If secret master keys of the CS are compromised, previously established
session keys should not be revealed.
C5. Freedom of password change: The password can freely be updated by the smart card holder (a
registered Ui ) at will, without any interaction with the Sj or the CS. The Sj or the CS can be totally unaware
of the password change.
C6. Scalability of login: If a Ui has ﬁnished the ﬁrst-time login to a certain Sj , any interaction with the
CS is not necessarily required when the Ui logs in to the same Sj once again. If a SCPA-MS scheme does not
hold the scalability of the login, when many logins happen at one time, a bottleneck will be caused. Since the
CS is required to engage in every login, if the Ui logs in to the same Sj the ﬁrst time and the CS does not
participate in it, this will easily lead to abuse of the login by a malicious Ui . Therefore, the Sj should be able
to control the login of the Ui .
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C7. Resistance to the stolen veriﬁer attacks: Neither the Sj nor the CS could get any information about
a registered Ui ’s password or anything derived from the password. In other words, each password is exclusive,
which means that the password or the derivatives of the password are only known and kept by the corresponding
Ui . In addition, the CS cannot keep the veriﬁcation tables for the Sj or the registered Ui .
C8. High eﬃciency: The password should be a short, easily remembered value in the password space. Due
to the power constraints and small ﬂash memory of smart cards, the smart card should have a low computation
and communication cost. Moreover, a Ui registers with the CS once and can access all of the eligible Sj s who
have registered with the same CS.
Remarks: Property C4 implies the following property always mentioned in the literature: no veriﬁcation
or password table is stored in a server. However, the latter does not imply property C4. Property C6 implies
the single registration mentioned in [16].

2.3.

Adversarial model

Consider adversary A, who gets full control over both the communication channel between the Ui and the
Sj and the communication channel between the Sj and the CS (except the registration phase). Thus, the A
could obtain all of the messages transmitted between the Ui and the Sj and all of the messages transmitted
between the Sj and the CS (except the registration message). Of all of the phases in a SCPA-MS scheme,
only the registration phase requires a secure channel between the Sj and the CS and a secure channel between
the Ui and the CS. In the other phases, there could be various kinds of passive and active adversaries in the
communication channel between the Ui and the Sj and the communication channel between the CS and the
Sj . The A can eavesdrop on and even block a transmitting message, modify messages, remove messages, or
insert messages into the communication channel. Its objective is to compromise mutual authentication between
the CS and the Sj , between the Ui and the Sj , and between the CS and the Ui . The A even impersonates the
Ui and attempts to access the Sj , or the A impersonates the Sj and provides the Ui with false service. In the
MS environment, the insider attacker is more powerful. In such an attack, the A is a malicious-but-registered
Ui or Sj . To simulate the insider attack, if a Ui is under attack, the A is allowed to get the passwords and
information stored on the smart cards of all of the Ui s, except those of a client under attack, and is also allowed
to have the registered messages of all of the Sj s. If a Sj is the attack target, we allow the A to obtain the
passwords and information stored on the smart cards of all of the Ui s and obtain the registered messages of
the other Sj s. If the control server is the A’s target, we allow the A to obtain the passwords and information
stored in the smart cards of all of the Ui s and obtain the registered messages of all of the Sj s.
For a SCPA scheme, one basic security property is that the Ui is required to both have the smart card
and know the password, which is often called 2-factor authentication. Since Messerges et al. [25] and Kocher
et al. [26] pointed out that all existing smart cards cannot prevent the information stored in them from being
extracted, for example, by monitoring their power consumption [27], the security of the SCPA scheme is always
discussed in the event that the smart card is stolen. In other words, when a Ui is under attack, we also allow
an A to either compromise the password or the smart card of the client under attack, but not both.
Only if the attack goal is to obtain previously established session keys can we allow an A to compromise
the secret master keys of the CS.
Remarks: The security requirements and adversarial model mentioned above can eliminate the redundancies and ambiguities of previously proposed requirements for the SCPA-MS scheme. It will also simplify
cryptanalyses of SCPA-MS schemes.
885

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci, Vol.20, No.6, 2012

3.

Cryptanalyses of 2 SCPA-MS schemes

In this section, we review the SAK-scheme [23] and the WJL-scheme [21]. The cryptanalyses show that the WJLscheme and the SAK-scheme fail to provide Sj authentication, perfect forward security, and login scalability.
The notations that we will use for describing the 2 SCPA-MS schemes are given in Table 1. These
notations will also be used throughout the paper.
Table 1. Notations.

Ui
Sj
CS
ID i
SID j
PW i

3.1.

ith user
jth service provider server
Control server
Unique identiﬁcation of the Ui
Identiﬁcation of the Sj
Password of the Ui

x,y
G
||
⊕
→
H( )

Secret master key of the CS
Generator of an elliptic curve group
Concatenation
XOR operation
Transmission of the message
One-way hash function

Review of WJL-scheme

In the WJL-scheme [21], the CS selects 2 large prime numbers, p and q , and keeps them secret. The CS
computes n = p × q and makes n public. The WJL-scheme consists of 4 phases, i.e. registration, login,
authentication and session key agreement, and password change.
1) Registration phase:
Step 1. Ui → CS : ID i
Step 2. CS → Ui : Smart card
The CS computes SK i = H (ID i ||x), stores (SK i , ID i , H ( ), n) on a smart card, and issues the smart
card to the Ui through a secure channel.
Step 3. Ui → Smart card: SKi
The Ui chooses a PW i , computes SKi = SK i ⊕ H (PW i ), and replaces SK i on the smart card with
SKi .
Similarly, the Sj registers with the CS. First, the Sj sends its identity, SID j , to the CS. The CS sends
SK j = H (SID j ||x) to the Sj over a secure communication channel.
2) Login phase:
The Ui keys in ID i , PW i , and SID j . The smart card generates a nonce, Ni , and computes Req i =
(ID i || SK i || SID j ||Ni )2 mod n. The smart card then sends Req i to the Sj .
3) Authentication and session key agreement phase:
Step 1. Sj → CS : Req i , SID j , Req j
The Sj chooses random nonce Nj , computes Req j = SK j ⊕ Nj , and sends {Req i , SID j , Req j } to the
CS.
Step 2. CS checks SK i ? = H (ID i ||x)
The CS decrypts Req i and obtains ID i || SK i || SID j ||Ni . The CS then checks SK i ? =H (ID i ||x). If
the equality does not hold, the CS rejects the login request. Otherwise, the CS chooses a random number, N ,
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and calculates:
SK j = H(SID j ||x), Nj = SK j ⊕ Req j , Res1 = H(SK j ||Nj ) ⊕ N,

(1)

KSC = H(SK j ||Nj ||N ), Rij = H(ID ij ||SID j ||Ni ), Res2 = KSC ⊕ Rij ,

(2)

Res3 = H(SK j ||Ni ||h(Nj )), Res4 = H(KSC ||Rij ||Res3 ).

(3)

Next, the CS sends the message (Res 1 , Res 2 , Res 3 , Res 4 ) to the Sj .
Step 3. Sj checks Res 4 ? =H(KSC ||Rij || Res 3 )
The Sj computes N = H (SK j ||Nj )⊕Res 1 , KSC = H (SK j ||Nj ||N ), Rij = KSC ⊕Res 2 and checks
whether Res 4 ? =H(KSC ||Rij || Res 3 ). If the equality does not hold, the Sj rejects the login request. Otherwise,
the Sj computes Res j2 = Rij ⊕ H(Nj ). Next, the Sj sends {Res j2 , Res 3 } to the smart card.
Step 4. Smart card checks Res 3 ? = H (SK j ||Ni ||H(Nj ))
The smart card computes H(Nj ) = Res j2 ⊕ H (ID j || SID j ||Ni ) and checks whether
Res 3 ? =H (SK j ||Ni ||H(Nj )). If the equality holds, the smart card computes Res i = H(H(Nj ) + 1), SK =
H (SID j ||H(Nj )||H (ID j || SID j ||Ni )) and sends Res i to the Sj .
Step 5. Sj checks Res i ? = H(H(Nj ) + 1)
Finally, the Ui , the Sj , and the CS agree on session key SK = H (SID j ||H(Nj )||Rij ).

3.2.

Cryptanalyses of the WJL-scheme

In the following section, we demonstrate that the WJL-scheme does not satisfy security properties C2 (service
provider server authentication), C4 (perfect forward security), or C6 (scalability of login).
WJL-scheme fails to provide service provider server authentication (C2)
In the WJL-scheme, the CS identiﬁes the Sj only by the SID j . The CS has not authenticated the Sj .
Thus, any A can impersonate the Sj and generate random message Req j . The A sends {Req i ,SID j ,Req j } to
the CS. The CS will then believe that the communicating party, A, is a Sj with a SID j .
WJL-scheme fails to provide perfect forward security (C4)
Suppose that the CS ’s secret master key x is compromised. An A mounts an attack as follows. First,
the A computes SK j = h(SID j ||x). According to the adversarial model, the A can intercept all of the
messages transmitted over the public communication channels. Without loss of generality, assume that the A
has obtained {Req j ,Res 1 ,Res 2 }. The A computesNj * = SK j ⊕Req j , N * = H (SK j ||Nj *)⊕Res 1 , KSC =
H (SK j ||Nj * ||N *), and Rij = Res 2 ⊕ KSC . A then computes session key SK = H (SID j ||H(Nj )||Rij ).
WJL-scheme fails to provide login scalability (C6)
From the description in Section 3.1, we know that in the WJL-scheme, each time a Ui logs in to a Sj ,
they must submit the Ui ’s request message to the CS, which will authenticate the legitimacy of the Ui . In
other words, the CS must interact with every login. Therefore, the WJL-scheme does not hold the scalability
of login.

3.3.

Review of the SAK-scheme

The SAK-scheme consists of 4 phases, i.e. registration, login, authentication and session key agreement, and
password change.
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1) Registration phase
The Ui registers with the CS by the following steps:
Step 1. Ui → CS : Ai , Bi
The Ui selects a random number b ; computes Ai = H (ID i ||b), Bi = H(b⊕PW i ); and submits { Ai , Bi }
to the CS over a secure communication channel.
Step 2. CS → Ui : Smart card
The CS selects a random number yi and computes Fi = Ai ⊕ yi , Gi = Bi ⊕ H(yi ) ⊕ H(x), and Ci =
Ai ⊕ H (y i ) ⊕ x , where x is its secret master key. The CS stores (y i ⊕ x , Ci ) in the user database, stores (Fi ,
Gi , H( )) on the smart card, and issues the smart card to the Ui through a secure channel.
Step 3. Ui → Smart card: Di , Ei
The Ui computes Di = b ⊕ H (ID i || PW i ), Ei = H (ID i || PW i )⊕PW

i

and stores them on the smart

card.
When the Sj registers with the CS, the Sj sends its unique SK j . The CS then stores SK j ⊕H(x|| SID j )
in the Sj database.
2) Login phase
Step 1. Smart card checks Ei ? = Ei *
The Ui inserts the smart card into a card reader to log in to the Sj and keys in the ID i *, PW i *, and
SID j . The smart card computes Ei * = H (ID i * || PW i *)⊕PW

i

* and veriﬁes the legitimacy of the Ui by

checking if Ei = Ei *.
Step 2. Smart card → Sj : SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi
If the equation holds, the smart card generates a random nonce N1 and computes
b = Di ⊕ H(ID i ||P W i ), Ai = H(ID i ||b), Bi = H(b ⊕ P W i ),

(4)

yi = Ai ⊕ Fi , H(x) = Bi ⊕ H(yi ) ⊕ Gi , Zi = H 2 (x) ⊕ N1 ,

(5)

CIDi = Ai ⊕ H(yi ) ⊕ H(x) ⊕ N1 , Mi = H(H(x)||yi ||SID j ||N1 ).

(6)

The smart card then sends the login request message {SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi } to the Sj .
3) Authentication and session key agreement phase
Step 1.Sj → CS : SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi , Ri
The Sj chooses a random nonce N2 , computes Ri = SK j ⊕ N2 , and sends {SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi , Ri }
to the CS.
Step 2. CS checks Ci ? =Ci *
The CS computes N1 = H 2 (x) ⊕ Ci , N2 = SK j ⊕ Ri , Ci * = CID i ⊕ H(x) ⊕ N1 ⊕ x and checks whether
Ci = Ci *. If the 2 values are equal, the CS goes on to Step 3. Otherwise, the CS rejects the login request.
Step 3. CS checks Mi ? =Mi *
The CS computesMi * = H(H(x)|| y i || SID j ||N1 ) and checks whether Mi ? =Mi *. If they are not equal,
the CS rejects the login request. Otherwise, the CS generates random nonceN3 and computes:
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Ki = N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ H(SK j ||N2 ), Xi = H(ID i ||yi ||N1 ) ⊕ H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 ),

(7)

Vi = H(H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 )||H(IDi ||yi ||N1 )), Ti = N3 ⊕ N2 ⊕ H(yi ||IDi ||H(x)||N1)).

(8)

TAN: Improvement of smart card based password authentication scheme for...,

Finally, the CS sends the message { Ki , Xi , Vi , Ti } back to the Sj .
Step 4. Sj checks Vi ? = Vi *
The Sj computes N1 ⊕ N3 = Ki ⊕ H (SK j ||N2 ), H (ID i || y i ||N1 ) = Xi ⊕ H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 ), and Vi *
=H(H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 )||H (ID i || y i ||N1 )). The Sj then veriﬁes the legitimacy of the CS by checking whether
Vi = Vi *. If the CS is conﬁrmed, the Sj sends (Vi , Ti ) to the smart card.
Step 5. Smart card checks Vi ? = Vi *
The smart card calculates Vi * = H(H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 )||H (ID i || y i ||N1 )) and checks whether Vi = Vi *.
Finally, the Ui , the Sj , and the CS agree on session key SK = H(H (ID i || y i ||N1 )||N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 ).
Here we omit the password change phase of the SAK-scheme.

3.4.

Cryptanalyses of the SAK-scheme

In this section, we will analyze the security of the SAK-scheme. We found that the SAK-scheme does not satisfy
security properties C1 (user authentication), C2 (service provider server authentication), C4 (perfect forward
security), C7 (resistance to stolen veriﬁer attacks), or C8 (scalability of login).
SAK-scheme does not hold user authentication (C1)
The SAK-scheme lacks user authentication. More speciﬁcally, the SAK-scheme cannot provide 2-factor
authentication. Privileged malicious user Uk , who has registered with the CS, can use his own smart card and
collect information (Fi , Gi , Di , Ei , H ( )) from his own smart card. The Uk can compute:
bk = Dk ⊕ H(ID k ||P W k ), Ak = H(ID k ||bk ),

(9)

Bk = H(bk ⊕ P W k ), yk = Ak ⊕ Fk , H(x) = Bk ⊕ H(yk ) ⊕ Gk .

(10)

If the Ui and Uk have both registered with the same CS, they have the same parameter H(x). Now the
Uk can intercept a valid login request message {SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi } of the Ui over the public communication
channel. Since the Uk has H(x), the Uk computes N1 = H 2 (x) ⊕ Zi . According to the requirements of
2-factor authentication, we can further assume that the Uk extracts the information from the Ui ’s smart card.
Thus, even if the Uk does not have knowledge of the Ui ’s password, the Uk can still compute secret values
{ Ai , H (y i ),y i } corresponding to the Ui . The attack is described as follows. The Uk ﬁrst computesBi =
H(Di ⊕ Ei ), H (y i ) = Gi ⊕ Bi ⊕ H(x), Ai = CID i ⊕ H (y i ) ⊕ H(x) ⊕ N1 , and y i = Ai ⊕ Fi .
The Uk then obtains these secret values { Ai , H (y i ),y i }, corresponding to the Ui , and thus the Uk can
impersonate the Ui to log in to a Sj . Here we will not describe the impersonation attack.
Furthermore, since values { Ai , H (y i ),y i } corresponding to the Ui are kept unchanged, after the Uk
intercepts the dynamic CID i from later login request messages, the Uk ﬁrst computes N1 = H 2 (x) ⊕ Zi
and then calculatesAi = CID i ⊕ H (y i ) ⊕ H(x) ⊕ N1 . Thus, the Uk can identify the Ui , because values
{ Ai , H (y i ),y i } are unique for each user.
The above analyses show that the SAK-scheme cannot provide 2-factor authentication and does not
meet property C1. The SAK-scheme cannot resist against insider attacks or impersonation attacks. This also
illustrates that the SAK-scheme has still not removed the weaknesses of the HS-scheme (see Sections 4.2 and
4.3 in [23]).
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SAK-scheme fails to provide service provider server authentication (C2)
During the authentication and session key agreement phase in the SAK-scheme, when the CS receives
message {SID j , Zi , CID i , Mi , Ri } sent by the Sj , the CS veriﬁes the legitimacy of the intended Ui by checking
Ci ? = Ci * and Mi ? = Mi *. However, the CS does not verify the legitimacy of the Sj . This easily leads to
the same security ﬂaws as in the WJL-scheme.
SAK-scheme fails to provide perfect forward security (C4)
Suppose that the CS ’s x and the Sj ’s database are compromised. Once an A has intercepted the message
transmitted over the public channel for each run of the protocol, the A can compute the session keys. First,
the A computesZi = H 2 (x) ⊕ N1 , N2 = SK j ⊕ Ri . The A then calculates N3 = N1 ⊕ Ki ⊕ H (SK j ||N2 ).
Note that the A may not access the user database, but the A is still able to compute H (ID i || y i ||N1 ) =
Xi ⊕ H(N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 ).
The A thus obtains session key SK = H(H (ID i || y i ||N1 )||N1 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N2 ).
SAK-scheme fails to provide login scalability (C6)
By applying similar analyses as for the WJL-scheme in Section 3.2, one can conclude that the SAKscheme does not hold scalability of login. In fact, from the description in Section 3.4, one can easily ﬁnd that,
in the SAK-scheme, the CS must check every login request of the Ui .
SAK-scheme suﬀers from stolen veriﬁer attacks (C7)
During the registration phase in the SAK-scheme, the CS stores (y i ⊕ x , Ci ) to a user database. In the
user database, each record corresponds to a Ui . Likewise, when a Sj registers them with the CS, the CS selects
a unique secret key SK j for each Sj and stores (SK j ⊕ H(x|| SID j ), SID j ), which corresponds to the Sj in
its database. Therefore, the SAK-scheme is vulnerable to stolen veriﬁer attacks.
In a similar way, we ﬁnd that the CHC-scheme [9] suﬀers from oﬄine password guessing attacks,
impersonation attacks, and server spooﬁng attacks. It fails to provide perfect forward security. For space
limitations, we omit the description of these attacks.

4.

A new proposed SCPA-MS scheme

In this section, we propose a new SCPA-MS scheme that removes all of the above weaknesses. The notations
used in this section are listed in Table 1. The CS generates the system parameters. Let G be a generator of
an elliptic curve group of prime order p. RC holds 2 master keys, x and y . The new SCPA-MS scheme is
composed of 4 phases, i.e. registration, login, authentication and session key agreement, and password change.
However, the login phases are diﬀerent for the ﬁrst-time login and the subsequent logins. The authentication
and session key agreement phases are not the same for the ﬁrst-time login and the subsequent logins.

4.1.

Registration phase

Step 1. Ui → CS : ID i
Step 2. CS → Ui : Smart card
The CS computes Ai = H (ID i ||x) and stores (Ai ,ID i , H ( )) to a smart card. The CS then issues the
smart card to the Ui through a secure channel.
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Step 3. Ui → Smart card: SKi
The Ui selects a PW i , computes H (ID i ||x) ⊕ H (ID i || PW i ), and replaces Ai on the smart card with
it.
Similarly, the Sj registers with the CS. At ﬁrst, the Sj sends its SID j to the CS. The CS sends
Bj = H(y|| SID j ) to the Sj over a secure communication channel.
We describe the next 2 phases in 2 cases, respectively: on the ﬁrst-time login (shown in Figures 1 and 2)
and on a subsequent login (shown in Figures 3 and 4).

Service provider server Sj

User Ui

Control server CS

(2) SIDj, IDi, X1, X2
(4) IDi, SIDj, X1, X2,Y1, Y2

(1) Ai= h(IDi||x)
Ni= aiG

(3) Nj=bjG
Y1=H(IDi||Bj) ⊕ Nj
Y2=H(X1||Bj||IDi||Nj||Y1)

X1=H(SIDj||Ai) ⊕ Ni
X2=H(Ai||SIDj||Ni|| X1).

Figure 1. Login phase on the ﬁrst-time login.

Service provider server Sj

User Ui

Control server CS
(1)
(2)Z1, Z2

(3) Ni** =H(IDi||Bj||Nj*) ⊕ Z1
Z2*=H(X1|| X2||Y1||Y2||Bj||Ni**||Z1
Z2?= Z2*

(5) D, R1, R2, R3
（6）
Nj* = H(SIDj||Ni||IDi||R1||D) ⊕ R2

H(IDi||Bj||D) =Nj* ⊕ Ni ⊕ R1
R3*=H(X1|| X2||R2||H(IDi||Bj||D)||Ni||Nj*)
R3?=R3*

(4)
R1=H(IDi||Bj||D) ⊕ Ni** ⊕ Nj

Ni*=H(SIDj||H(IDi||x)) ⊕ X1

Nj*=H(IDi||H(y||SIDj)) ⊕ Y1
X2*=H(Ai||SIDj||Ni*|| X1)
Y2*=H(X1||Bj||IDi||Nj*||Y1)
X2?= X2* ,Y2?=Y2*

Z1=H(IDi||Bj|| Nj*) ⊕ Ni*
Z2=H(X1|| X2||Y1||Y2||Bj||Ni*|| Z1)

R2=H(SIDj||Ni**||IDi||R1||D) ⊕ Nj
R3=H(X1|| X2||R2||H(IDi||Bj||D)||Ni**||Nj)
SK ʹ =H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2||R1||R2||R3||D||bjNi**)

R=H(IDi||Bj||D) ⊕ H(SIDj||IDi||PWi||D)
stores (R,D)
SK=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2||R1||R2||R3||D||aiNj*)

Figure 2. Authentication and session key agreement phase on the ﬁrst-time login.

Service provider server Sj

User Ui
(1) H(IDi||Bj||D)=R ⊕ H(SIDj||IDi||PWi||D)
Ni= aiG

(2) D, IDi, X1, X2

X1= H(IDi||Bj||D) ⊕ Ni
X2=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||Ni)

Figure 3. Login phase on a login other than the ﬁrst.
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Service provider server Sj

User Ui

(2) R1, R2
（3）
Nj*=H((R ⊕ H(SIDj||IDi||PWi||D))||Ni) ⊕ R1*
R2*=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2*||R1||Ni||Nj*)
R2?=R2*
SK=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2||R1||R2||D||aiNj*)

(1)
Ni*=H(IDi||Bj||D) ⊕ X1
X2*=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||Ni*)
X2?= X2*
R1=H(H(IDi||Bj||D)||Ni*) ⊕ Nj
R2=H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2*||R1||Ni*||Nj)

SKʹ =H(IDi||SIDj||X1||X2||R1||R2||D||bjNi*).

Figure 4. Authentication and session key agreement phase on a login other than the ﬁrst.

4.2.

Login phase on the ﬁrst-time login

When the Ui logs into the Sj , the Ui inserts his smart card into a card reader and keys the ID i , PW i , and
SID j .
The smart card computes Ai = (H (ID i ||x) ⊕ H (ID i || PW i )) ⊕ H (ID i || PW i ). It then chooses random
nonce ai ∈ Zp∗ and calculates:
Ni = ai G, X1 = H(SID j ||Ai ) ⊕ Ni , X2 = H(Ai ||SID j ||Ni ||X1 ).

(11)

Next, the smart card sends request message {SID j , ID i , X1 , X2 } to the Sj . Upon receiving the request
message, the Sj chooses random nonce bj ∈ Zp∗ and calculates:
Nj = bj G, Y1 = H(ID i ||Bj ) ⊕ Nj , Y2 = H(X1 ||Bj ||IDi ||Nj ||Y1 ).

(12)

The Sj then transmits {ID i , SID j , X1 , X2 , Y1 , Y2 } to the CS.

4.3.

Authentication and session key agreement phase on the ﬁrst-time login

Step 1. CS checksX2 ? =X2 * and Y2 ? = Y2 *
The CS computes:
Ni ∗ = H(SID j ||H(IDi ||x)) ⊕ X1 , Nj ∗ = H(ID i ||H(y||SID j )) ⊕ Y1 ,

(13)

X2 ∗ = H(Ai ||SID j ||Ni ∗ ||X1 ), Y2 ∗ = H(X1 ||Bj ||IDi ||Nj ∗ ||Y1 ),

(14)

and checks whetherX2 ? =X2 * and Y2 ? = Y2 *. If either of them does not hold, the CS rejects the login
request. Otherwise, the CS calculates:
Z1 = H(ID i ||Bj ||Nj ∗) ⊕ Ni ∗, Z2 = H(X1 ||X2 ||Y1 ||Y2 ||Bj ||N i ∗ ||Z1 ).

(15)

The CS then sends message (Z1 , Z2 ) back to the Sj .
Step 2. Sj checks Z2 ? =Z2 *
The Sj computes Ni ** = H (ID i ||Bj ||Nj *)⊕Z1 , Z2 * = H(X1 ||X2 ||Y1 ||Y2 ||Bj || N i ** ||Z1 ), and veriﬁes
the legitimacy of the CS by checking whetherZ2 ? =Z2 *. If the equation holds, the Sj determines expiration
dateD , and the Sj allows the Ui to log in to it without any interaction with the CS. Next, the Sj computes:
R1 = H(ID i ||Bj ||D) ⊕ Ni ∗ ∗ ⊕ Nj , R2 = H(SID j ||Ni ∗ ∗||IDi ||R1||D) ⊕ Nj ,
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R3 = H(X1 ||X2 ||R2||H(IDi ||Bj ||D)||Ni ∗ ∗||Nj ).

(17)

Finally, the Sj sends { D , R1 , R2 , R3 } to the smart card.
Step 3. Smart card checks R3 ? = R3 *
Upon receiving message { D , R1 , R2 , R3 }, the smart card calculates:
Nj ∗ = H(SID j ||Ni ||IDi ||R1||D) ⊕ R2 , H(IDi ||Bj ||D) = Nj ∗ ⊕Ni ⊕ R1 ,

(18)

R3 ∗ = H(X1 ||X2 ||R2||H(IDi ||Bj ||D)||Ni ||Nj ∗).

(19)

The smart card checks if R3 = R3 *. If the above equality holds, the smart card computes R =
H (ID i ||Bj ||D) ⊕ H (SID j || ID i || PW i ||D) and stores (R , D) to the card. The Ui then computes the session
key:
SK = H(ID i ||SIDj ||X1 ||X2 ||R1||R2||R3 ||D||aiNj ∗).

(20)

The Sj also can obtain the following session key:
SK  = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ||R1 ||R2||R3||D||bj Ni ∗ ∗).

(21)

If all of the participants follow the protocol, then ai Nj * = bj Ni **. This implies that SK = SK  . Thus,
we have conﬁrmed the correctness of the proposed SCPA-MS scheme.

4.4.

Login phase on a subsequent login

The Ui inserts the smart card into a card reader and keys the ID i , PW i , and SID j . The smart card then
carries out the following steps:
1) Compute H (ID i ||Bj ||D) = R ⊕ H (SID j || ID i || PW i ||D).
2) Select random nonce ai ∈ Zp∗ and calculate
Ni = ai G, X1 = H(ID i ||Bj ||D) ⊕ Ni , X2 = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||Ni ).

(22)

3) Send request message { D , ID i , X1 , X2 } to the Sj .

4.5.

Authentication and session key agreement phase on a subsequent login

After receiving request message { D , ID i , X1 , X2 }, the Sj executes the following steps:
1) Check if the login has expired via D .
2) Compute Ni * = H (ID i ||Bj ||D) ⊕ X1, X2 * = H (ID i || SID j ||X1 ||Ni *).
3) CheckX2 ? = X2 *. If the equation holds, the Sj continues.
4) Compute
R1 = H(H(ID i ||Bj ||D)||Ni ∗) ⊕ Nj , R2 = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ∗ ||R1||Ni ∗ ||Nj ).

(23)

5) Send { R1 , R2 } to the smart card.
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Upon receiving message { R1 , R2 }, the smart card calculates:
Nj ∗ = H((R ⊕ H(SID j ||IDi ||P W i ||D))||Ni ) ⊕ R1 ∗,

(24)

R2 ∗ = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ∗ ||R1 ||Ni ||Nj ∗).

(25)

The smart card checks if R2 = R2 *. If the above equality holds, the smart card computes the session key:
SK = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ||R1||R2||D||aiNj ∗).

(26)

The service provider server computes the following session key:
SK  = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ||R1||R2||D||bj Ni ∗).

(27)

It is easy to conﬁrm the correctness of the proposed SCPA-MS scheme.

4.6.

Password change phase

If the Ui wants to change his PW i , the Ui inserts the smart card and keys in the ID i and PW i . The Ui
carries out the following steps:
1) Select a new password, P Wi .
2) Compute (H (ID i ||x) ⊕ H (ID i || PW i )) ⊕H (ID i || PW i ) ⊕ H (ID i ||P Wi).
3) Replace (H (ID i ||x) ⊕ H (ID i || PW i )) with the above result on the smart card.

5.
5.1.

Analyses of the proposed SCPA-MS scheme
Security analyses

In the following section, we analyze our SCPA-MS scheme according to the security requirements given in
Section 2.2. We also demonstrate that our scheme can resist against some well-known security threats.
Theorem 1. The proposed SCPA-MS scheme holds user authentication (C1).
Proof. In the proposed scheme, since the CS can authenticate the Ui by checking the validity of information
{ID i , X1 , X2 }, the undetectable online password guessing attack will not work. The password is not applied
to compute any authentication messages. Therefore, no A can guess the password successfully from the
authentication message.
On the other hand, a malicious Sj can get { Ni , X1 , X2, , Z1 , Z2 }, but { Ni , X1 , X2, , Z1 , Z2 } does not
contain any information about the Ui ’s password and malicious server Sk cannot guess the Ui ’s password from
this information. Hence, our improved scheme can resist against the oﬄine guessing attack by a Sk .
Without loss of generality, assume that an A obtains a smart card and the password of the card owner
is unknown to the A. The A can then extract the information stored on the smart card. The password is
protected on the card as h(ID i ||x) ⊕ h(ID i || PW i ) while h(ID i ||x) is contained in { X1 , X2 , Z2 }, but X1 and
X2 are provided with a random nonce, Ni . Z2 is mixed with random nonce Ni . It is infeasible to extract
h(ID i ||x) from { X1 , X2 } or Z2 . Therefore, an A cannot obtain a veriﬁcation function about the password
from the stored information h(ID i ||x) ⊕ h(ID i || PW i ) or the transmitted information.
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The above analyses show that the proposed scheme can resist against password guessing attacks and
provide 2-factor security.
We now consider the impersonation attack in the worst case: a Sk attempts to impersonate a Ui who has
never accessed the Sj . In order to impersonate the Ui to log in other Sj s, the Sk computes request message
{ X1 , X2 }. However, the message depends on Ai . The Sj could compute Ti only through 2 approaches. One
approach is to compute it from the Ui ’s past request message, but the Sj cannot obtain h(ID i ||x) since
h(ID i ||x) is protected by random number Ni . The other approach is to compute it from the past conﬁrmation
message, { Z1 , Z2 }, sent by the CS. However, the A still cannot obtain h(ID i ||x), because h(ID i ||x) is mixed
with random nonces Ni and Nj .
Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist impersonation attacks. It provides strong user authentication.
Theorem 2. The proposed SCPA-MS scheme provides service provider server authentication (C2).
Proof. Assume that a Sk tries to cheat a Ui or CS by masquerading as a Sj . Although the A has its secret
value Bk , since H ( ) is a collision-resistant hash function, the Sk still cannot compute secret key Bj of the
Sj . Thus, the A cannot produce valid pair { Y1 , Y2 } (on the ﬁrst-time login) or { R1 , R2 } (on a subsequent
login). In other words, the A cannot fool the CS or Ui by masquerading as a Sj .
Next, the A also cannot compute Ni from H (ID i ||Bj ||Nj ) ⊕ Z1 . It is thus infeasible to compute
{ R1 , R2 , R3 } such that R3 = H(X1 ||X2 ||R2 ||H (ID i ||Bj ||D)||Ni ||Nj *) holds.
Hence, the server spooﬁng attacks fail. The proposed SCPA-MS scheme provides service provider server
authentication.
Theorem 3. The proposed SCPA-MS scheme provides control server authentication (C3).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that the proposed scheme can prevent any A from obtaining the CS ’s secret master key.
The secret key x is hashed in the form h(ID i ||x) and the secret key y is hashed into the form h(y|| SID j ).
During the transmission of the above values, they are hashed by adding some random integers and other
information. Upon the assumptions of collision-resistant hash functions, an A cannot extract x or y from
h(ID i ||x) or h(SID j ||y).
Next, it is infeasible that an A cheats a Ui or a Sj by masquerading as a CS. Since the A does not have x
or y , the A cannot compute Ai or Bj . Therefore, it is infeasible to compute Ni from H (SID j ||H (ID i ||x)) ⊕X1
or Nj from H (ID i ||H(y|| SID j )) ⊕Y1 . Thus, the A cannot generate valid pair { Z1 , Z2 }. When an A sends a
forged authentication message, the Sj will ﬁnd that the information is not from the CS. Likewise, the smart card
can identify that the message is forged, since veriﬁcation equation R3 = H(X1 ||X2 ||R2||H (ID i ||Bj ||D)||Ni ||Nj )
will not hold. Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist control server spooﬁng attacks.
Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 imply that the proposed SCPA-MS scheme can also resist against
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Theorem 4. Upon the computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumptions, the proposed SCPA-MS scheme holds
perfect forward security (C4).
Proof. Assume that the CS ’s master secret keys x and y are disclosed. The A attempts to learn a used
session key. The A can intercept all of the messages transmitted among the Ui , the Sj , and the CS.
1) First-time login
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With knowledge of x , the A can compute:
Ai = H(ID i ||x), Ni = H(SID j ||H(IDi ||x)) ⊕ X1 .

(28)

Likewise, the A uses y to compute:
Bj = H(y||SID j ), Nj = H(ID i ||Bj ) ⊕ Y1 .

(29)

However, the A still cannot work out:
SK = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ||R1 ||R2||R3||D||aiNj ).

(30)

This is because the A has to work out ai Nj or bj Ni . The A will be confronted with an instance,
(Ni , Nj , ai Nj ) or (Ni , Nj , bj Ni ), of computational Diﬃe-Hellman problems.
2) Subsequent login
With knowledge of y , the A can compute:
Ni = H(ID i ||H(y||SID j )||D) ⊕ X1 , Nj = H(H(IDi ||Bj ||D)||Ni ) ⊕ R1 .

(31)

However, in order to calculate the session key,
SK = H(ID i ||SID j ||X1 ||X2 ||R1||R2||D||ai Nj ),

(32)

the A will still be confronted with a computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem, (Ni , Nj , ai Nj ) or (Ni , Nj , bj Ni ).
Therefore, the proposed scheme provides perfect forward security.
The proof of Theorem 4 also shows that in the proposed SCPA-MS scheme, both the Ui and the Sj agree
on the session key. Meanwhile, on the computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumptions, the probability that the A
computes other session keys from one session key is still negligible. Next, the proposed scheme is secure against
replay attacks. Even if the CS conﬁrms that the replay message is valid, on the assumptions of Diﬃe-Hellman,
the A still cannot compute a fresh session key.
It is easily conﬁrmed that our proposed scheme satisﬁes the following properties, C5-C8.
Freedom of password change (C5)
In the proposed SCPA-MS scheme, the Ui can change the password freely without any interaction with
the Sj or the CS.
Scalability of login (C6)
In the proposed SCPA-MS scheme, when a Ui has ﬁnished the ﬁrst-time login to a Sj , the Ui stores
(R , D) to the card. The next time that the Ui logs in to the Sj before the D , the Ui interacts only with the
Sj to agree to a new session key, without interaction with the CS. To some extent, D helps the Sj control the
login of the Ui . In addition, the Sj can also introduce the number of logins to control the login of the Ui ,
without any interaction with the CS.
Resistance to the stolen veriﬁer attacks (C7)
Since the proposed SCPA-MS scheme does not maintain a user veriﬁcation table or a password table in
the CS or the Sj , and does not maintain a Sj database in the CS, no Ui or Sj veriﬁable information can be
obtained from the CS. Thus, the proposed scheme can prevent the stolen veriﬁer attack.
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High eﬃciency (C8)
In the proposed SCPA-MS scheme, if a Ui has registered with the CS once, the Ui can access all of
the eligible Sj s registered with the same CS. The proposed protocol is eﬃcient because only the one-way hash
functions, exclusive-OR (XOR) operations, and 2 scalar multiplications in the elliptic curve group are required
by the smart card. The detailed eﬃciency analyses will be shown in Section 5.2.

5.2.

Performance and functionality analyses

Due to the resource constraints of the smart card, the SCPA scheme must take eﬃciency into consideration.
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the proposed SCPA-MS scheme and make comparisons
with some SCPA-MS schemes in Table 2. We evaluate the eﬃciency in terms of both communication cost and
computation cost. Assume that ID i , SID j , x and y , D , PW i , the nonce values, and the timestamp are 128
bits long; the large prime in the modular operation in the elliptic curve group is 160 bits long, and the large
prime in the modular operation in other groups is 1024 bits long, as in practical implementation. Moreover, we
also assume that both the size of the output of the secure one-way hashing function H ( ) and the block size of
the secure symmetric cryptosystem are 128 bits. To analyze the computational complexity of the schemes, we
deﬁne the notation Th , Tm , Te , and Tsy as the time cost for 1 hash operation, 1 scalar multiplication in the
elliptic curve group, 1 modular exponentiation, and 1 symmetric encryption/decryption, respectively. Because
the XOR operation requires very few computations, its computational cost is usually neglected. Let TM and
Tinv be the time cost of 1 scalar multiplication and 1 inversion operation in Z p , respectively.
In our scheme, the parameters stored in the smart card are { Ai ⊕ H (ID i || PW i ), ID i , H ( )} and
{ R , D } (on logins other than the ﬁrst), so the memory needed (E1) on the smart card is, at most, 640
(=128 × 5) bits. The communication cost includes the capacity of transmitting the message involved in
the login phase and the authentication and session key agreement phase. The Ui is required to transmit
{SID j ,ID i , X1 , X2 } (on the ﬁrst-time login) or { D ,ID i , X1 , X2 } (on any subsequent login). The Sj needs to
transmit {ID i ,SID j , X1 , X2 , Y1 , Y2 , D , R1 , R2 , R3 } (on the ﬁrst-time login) or { R1 , R2 } (on any subsequent
login). The CS is required to transmit (Z1 , Z2 ) to the Sj only on the ﬁrst-time login. Hence, the communication
Table 2. Communication cost and computation cost comparison.

Ours (case 1)
Ours (case 2)
Sandeep et al. [23]
Wang et al. [21]
Chen et al. [9] (case 1)
Chen et al. [9] (case 2)
Hsiang et al. [22]
Liao et al. [8]
Tsai [20]
Juang [16]
Lin et al. [28]

E1
384 bits
640 bits
640 bits
3200 bits
256 bits
1280 bits
768 bits
640 bits
384 bits
256 bits
5120 bits

E2
2048 bits
768 bits
1920 bits
10496 bits
11904 bits
4480 bits
2176 bits
896 bits
1664 bits
1152 bits
7424 bits

E3
3Th
3Th
5Th
3Th
3Th
3Th
7Th
5Th
2Th
2Th + 2Tsy
5Te + 4TM +
2Tinv

E4
8Th + 2Tm
3Th + 2Tm
10Th + Te
6Th + Te
5Th + 3Te
3Th + 2Te
11Th
9Th
5Th
3Th + 3Tsy
2Te

E5
8Th + 2Tm
5Th + 2Tm
5Th
6Th
4Th + 3Te
3Th + 2Te
9Th
6Th
7Th
3Th + 6Tsy
7Te + TM

E6
4Th
0
9Th + Te
8Th + Tsy
6Th
0
5Th
0
6Th
Th + 2Tsy
0

Note: E2 denotes the communication cost of the login phase and the authentication and session key agreement phase.
E3 denotes the computation cost of a Ui and one Sj .
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cost (E2) of the login phase and the authentication and session key agreement phase is a total of 2048 (=128
× 16) bits on the ﬁrst-time login or 768 (=128 × 6) bits for subsequent logins.
The computation cost of registration is deﬁned as the total time of various operations in the registration
phase. In our SCPA-MS scheme, the computation cost (E3) of registration is 3 Th . We discuss the E3 in 2
cases: on the ﬁrst-time login, the computation costs of the smart card (E4), the service provider server (E5),
and the control server (E6) are 8Th + 2 Tm , 8 Th + 2 Tm , and 4 Th , respectively; and on subsequent logins, the
E4 and the E5 are 3 Th + 2 Tm and 5 Th + 2 Tm , respectively.
Of all of the previous SCPA-MS schemes in the literature, the LW-scheme [8] has higher eﬃciency and
does not require any interaction of the CS each time the Ui logs in to the Sj . However, all of the Sj s know the
y of the CS. Moreover, after the Ui logs in to a Sj , the Sj can obtain the Ui ’s private information, H (ID i ||x).
These ﬂaws will lead to a lack of user authentication and control server authentication. In essence, the LWscheme suﬀers from control server spooﬁng and service provider server spooﬁng [21]. The Lin et al. scheme [28]
does not require the interaction of the CS for the Ui to log in, but the use of public keys makes its E2 and E3
very high. Table 2 shows that our SCPA-MS scheme is very eﬃcient. Especially compared with the SCPA-MS
schemes that keep the Ui ’s login free of interaction of the CS, our scheme requires less computations.
We summarize the proposed scheme and make comparisons with some SCPA-MS schemes. The comparison results for security requirements are summarized in Table 3. These demonstrate that our schemes can
achieve the essential requirements for a secure SCPA-MS scheme. The WJL-scheme [21] requires a smart card
with a large memory and high E2. The CHC-scheme [9] also needs a high E2. Therefore, the 2 schemes cannot
provide property C8. In addition, the HS-scheme [22], Tsai scheme [20], and Juang scheme [16] require that the
CS participate in every Ui login. Therefore, none of these schemes can provide property C6. The analyses of
other properties of these schemes can be found in [8,16-23].
Table 3. Functionality comparison.

Ours
Sandeep et al. [23]
Wang et al. [21]
Chen et al. [9]
Hsiang et al. [22]
Liao et al. [8]
Tsai [20]
Juang [16]
Lin et al. [28]

6.

C1
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No

C2
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

C3
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

C4
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

C5
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

C6
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

C7
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

C8
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Conclusion

SCPA in MS environments is important in the real user-server world. In this paper, we presented the cryptanalyses of 2 identity-based smart card authentication schemes for MS environments. We found that the schemes
of Wang et al. and Sandeep et al. failed to provide service provider server authentication and perfect forward security. Moreover, they lacked login scalability. In addition, the scheme of Sandeep et al. suﬀers from
stolen veriﬁer attacks. An improved SCPA-MS scheme was proposed. The proposed SCPA-MS scheme inherits
the merits of the schemes of Wang et al. and Sandeep et al. It removes their weaknesses. Security analyses
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demonstrate that the proposed SCPA-MS protocol can withstand various possible attacks and satisﬁes all of
the security requirements. The functionality comparison conﬁrms the advantages of our scheme in contrast
to the previous SCPA-MS schemes. Our SCPA-MS scheme is practical and eﬃcient. Dynamic identity-based
authentication protocols can provide anonymity and protection of the login user. However, the WJL-scheme
and the SAK-scheme have some security defects. Future work must be done to design secure dynamic identity
SCPA-MS schemes in which the veriﬁcation message is not required in the CS.
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